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Measuring Reporting Conservatism using the Dichev-Tang (2008) Model 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper provides a critical evaluation of an alternative measure of reporting conservatism 
introduced by Dichev and Tang (2008). Although there is substantial interest in research on 
accounting conservatism, there is no consensus among researchers on the most appropriate 
measure of conservatism in empirical studies. Dichev and Tang (2008) introduce a new 
measure of conservatism, which they believe to be a “natural and practical measure of 
conservatism (p. 1441).” However, the econometric properties of this measure have not been 
fully evaluated, and previous studies have not provided evidence of this measure’s construct 
validity. Based on a parsimonious model of conservatism, I find that the Dichev and Tang 
(2008) measure is increasing in the conservatism parameter. However, although this measure 
produces well-specified test statistics that generate Type 1 errors according to researchers’ 
specifications, it generates tests of low power that lead to relatively high Type 2 errors. Next, 
I use actual data to provide evidence consistent with the construct validity of this measure. 
Finally, I suggest an alternative measure by using the reverse regression specification of the 
Dichev and Tang (2008) model. Results from simulations suggest that this alternative 
measure is feasible and is slightly superior to the Dichev and Tang (2008) measure in terms 
of test power. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Financial reporting conservatism is one of the most prominent qualitative attributes of 
accounting, and its economic role and continued existence have been a focus of debate 
and research attention among regulators, practitioners and academics (e.g., FASB, 2005; 
Watts, 2003). As a result of extensive interest in this important topic, researchers wanting 
to test various theories and hypotheses of accounting conservatism have attempted to 
quantify and operationalize the notion of conservatism in their studies. Basu (1997) 
introduced a market-based measure of conservatism that has been widely used in the 
literature. However, various studies examine the econometric properties of this measure 
and highlight its shortcomings and limitations (e.g., Dietrich, Mueller & Riedl, 2007; 
Givoly, Hayn & Natarajan, 2007; Patatoukas & Thomas, 2010). Given the documented 
deficiencies of this measure and the limitations of other measures (e.g., the market-to-
book ratio), there is no consensus among researchers on the most appropriate measure of 
conservatism in empirical studies.  
 The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical evaluation of an alternative measure 
of reporting conservatism introduced recently by Dichev and Tang (2008) in their 
matching model. The authors develop a model of matching expenses to the associated 
revenue and examine how the amount of matching success affects various properties of 
accounting earnings. In their model, Dichev and Tang (2008) characterize the 
mismatching of expenses as introducing noise over and above economics-driven 
volatility in the process of earnings measurement, and they demonstrate that poor 
matching leads to lower contemporaneous correlation between revenue and expenses, 
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higher volatility of earnings and lower persistence of earnings. The authors corroborate 
their model’s findings by examining the relationship between revenue and expenses over 
the last 40 years, and they conclude that the temporal decline in matching success 
contributes to increased earnings volatility and reduced earnings persistence over time. 
 The analysis of Dichev and Tang (2008) that is particularly relevant to this study is 
their empirical examination of the relationship between revenue and past, present and 
future expenses. In particular, they estimate the following empirical model: 
                                                             
The coefficient of interest to the authors is   , which measures the relationship between 
revenue and contemporaneous expenses. Perfect matching of expenses to the associated 
revenue for a profitable entity implies     , and both    and    equal 0. Dichev and 
Tang (2008) document a trend of declining    in annual cross-sectional regressions from 
1967 to 2003, which they interpret as a decline in matching over time.  
 In this model,    measures the extent to which expenses are recognized ahead of the 
associated revenue. Dichev and Tang (2008) suggest that    can be used as a “natural and 
practical measure of conservatism,” especially in light of the growing research interest in 
reporting conservatism and the limitations of existing empirical measures of conservatism 
(Dichev & Tang, 2008, p. 1441). They document a trend of increasing    over the same 
sample period, which they suggest is evidence of increased conservatism over time. This 
latter finding is consistent with Givoly and Hayn (2000), who conclude an upward trend 
of reporting conservatism using a different empirical methodology over a comparable 
sample period.  
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 However, this measure suggested by Dichev and Tang (2008) has its limitations. 
First, the econometric properties of this measure have not been fully evaluated in prior 
work. For instance (to be elaborated in greater detail later), the observed current expenses 
are incurred to earn past, current and future revenue and thus there is an errors-in-
variables problem. It is not obvious whether this measurement error affects the suitability 
of using    as a measure of reporting conservatism. Second, prior studies have not 
provided evidence of this measure’s construct validity. This paper addresses these gaps in 
the current literature. 
 Based on certain model assumptions, I propose that researchers can determine the 
unobserved level of reporting conservatism by analyzing the Dichev and Tang (2008) 
measure. However, although this measure produces well-specified test statistics that 
generate Type 1 errors according to researchers’ specifications, it generates tests of low 
power that lead to relatively high Type 2 errors. Next, I use actual data to support the 
construct validity of this measure. Finally, I explore an alternative measure of 
conservatism using a reverse regression specification. Results from simulations suggest 
that this measure is feasible and is slightly superior to the Dichev and Tang (2008) 
measure in terms of test power. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I explore a simple 
model of matching, highlight how the concept of conservatism relates to the model, and 
assess whether the estimated    coefficient from the Dichev and Tang (2008) model can 
be utilized to measure reporting conservatism analytically. In section 3, I conduct 
simulations to test the specification and power of the model. In section 4, I provide 
construct validity tests of this measure of conservatism using actual data. I then examine 
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an alternative measure of conservatism using a reverse regression specification in Section 
5. Section 6 offers conclusions. 
 
2. Model of Matching and the Concept of Conservatism 
 
2.1 Basic Model of Matching 
 I consider a simple model of revenue and expenses for an economic entity. First, I 
define the following generating process for expenditures incurred to generate revenue in 
time t (   :1 
                               (1) 
where    denotes a random shock in expenditures, and is modeled as mean-zero white 
noise.2 In this process, there could be time-series dependence between current and past 
expenditures, depending on the value of   . When     , expenditures are independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), whereas when     , expenditures follow a random 
walk process.    represents a constant term (or a drift in expenditures when     ) , 
which I include here for completeness, but this is not crucial to my analysis that is 
presented later.  
 In this model, the relationship between revenue (  ) and expenditures (  ) is assumed 
to be the following: 
                             (2) 
                                                          
1 Throughout this paper, I use the expression “expenditures” and “costs” synonymously to refer to the true 
economic costs incurred to earn revenue in a particular time period.  
2 That is,  [  ]     [   ]      and  [     ]        . 
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where    denotes a random shock in revenue, and is also modeled as a mean-zero white 
noise.   represents the contemporaneous relationship between expenditures incurred to 
generate revenue in period t and that period’s revenue. For a profitable entity,      and 
       can be interpreted as the profit margin of the firm.    represents a constant 
term, which again is included for completeness. Consistent with Dichev and Tang (2008), 
I view the firm as an entity that continually incurs costs to reap revenues and earnings, 
and the success of the firm is measured by its ability to earn revenue in excess of costs 
that are incurred to obtain that revenue (that is, having higher profit margin or   ). 
 At the end of every fiscal period, the firm observes expenditures and attempts to 
match expenditures to the associated revenue. In principle, the goal of accounting 
matching is to reflect business reality and hence to match costs incurred to earn revenue 
in the same reporting period.3 The relationship between reported expenses at time t (  ) 
and true economic costs incurred to earn revenue at time t (  ) is expressed in a two-
period matching model as follows:4 
                                (3) 
In the case of perfect matching,       and    , which means that the firm is able to 
recognize all costs incurred to earn the corresponding revenue in the same reporting 
                                                          
3 The principle of matching is obviously subjected to certain practical limits. For example, certain costs 
incurred like research and development expenditure is difficult, if not impossible, to match accurately to a 
specific revenue. 
4 Dichev and Tang (2008) model the relation between true expenditures and recognized expenses in a 
slightly different way. In particular, they modeled recognized expenses as         , where       
    . In this specification,   is a random variable that represents matching error, which self-corrects in the 
following period. The authors do not model   as I do in equation (3) because the focus of their paper is on 
the additional volatility to earnings due to poor matching, and not on the propensity to recognize 
expenditures early (reporting conservatism). 
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period. In the case of imperfect matching,       and    , which indicates that the 
firm recognizes some proportion of expenditures that are related to time t in the current 
period, and recognizes the remainder of expenditures that are related to time t in the 
following fiscal period. In this model of matching,   denotes reporting conservatism 
because   measures the extent to which expenditures are recognized ahead of the 
associated revenue. In this model, conservatism is a manifestation of a lack of matching. 
 Note that I only consider a two-period instead of a three-period matching model as 
studied by Dichev and Tang (2008) because the focus of my paper is on reporting 
conservatism that is estimated from    in their empirical model. Considering a three-
period model will add more complexity to the analysis without providing significant 
insights beyond that obtained by examining a two-period model. Furthermore, Dichev 
and Tang (2008) provide evidence that the temporal decline in the matching of expenses 
with the associated revenue is the consequence of increased advancing of rather than 
delaying of expense recognition over time, which suggests that analyzing a two-period 
model is sufficient in the context of this paper. 
 The success of matching across different firms (that is, (   )) is affected by various 
factors, including cost structure (e.g., the extent of fixed versus variable costs and the 
traceability of costs); accounting rules (e.g., rules relating to research and development 
expenses); and managerial discretion. In examining the econometric properties of this 
model, I do not separately consider these determinants of matching success in order to 
keep the model simple and tractable. This simplification does not prevent me from 
drawing reasonable conclusions from this basic model. 
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 In order to estimate the level of reporting conservatism using the Dichev and Tang 
(2008) model, the researcher estimates the following empirical equation: 
                                   (4) 
 In this equation,    measures the relationship between current revenue and past 
expenses, which Dichev and Tang (2008) suggest to be consistent with the notion of 
reporting conservatism. As mentioned in the preceding discussion, I define the 
unobserved true level of reporting conservatism as   in the matching model (equation 3). 
Hence, the key to evaluating the appropriateness of using    as a measure of 
conservatism is to first assess whether we can infer   from estimating    in empirical 
equation (4). Once I have demonstrated the correspondence between   and   , I can then 
evaluate the estimation efficiency of using    to measure reporting conservatism.  
 It is important to note that the empirical researcher can observe only recognized 
expenses ( ) but not true expenditures and their components ( ). In the following sub-
sections, I will explore three scenarios of matching and observability of costs to illustrate 
if the estimated    coefficient of the model can be utilized to measure the magnitude of 
reporting conservatism in the sample population. 
 
2.2 Perfect Matching with Perfect Observation of Cost Components 
 First, I begin with the scenario where there is perfect matching of revenue with 
contemporaneous costs incurred to earn that revenue. This implies: 
      ;                    (5) 
An example of perfect matching is the case of a firm where all costs are directly traceable 
to revenue (e.g., cost of goods sold and variable sales commission). In this scenario, 
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estimating empirical equation (4) is similar to estimating the revenue model (2) because 
the researcher is able to infer true expenditures (  ) from observing recognized expenses 
(  ). If the researcher estimates empirical equation (4),  [  ]    and  [  ]     . 
Conservatism is nonexistent in this scenario of perfect matching because firms are always 
able to match expenditures to their associated revenue. Hence, the only information 
derived from estimating the Dichev and Tang (2008) model is the profit margin   , based 
on the assumption of perfect matching with perfect observation of cost components.  
 
2.3 Imperfect Matching with Perfect Observation of Cost Components 
 Next, I consider a case where there is imperfect matching of revenue with 
contemporaneous costs incurred to earn that revenue. Hence, the recognized expenses are 
expressed as follows (similar to equation (3)): 
                              (3a’) 
                     ;              (3b’) 
In this scenario, perfect observability by the researcher is assumed, and she can observe 
all the individual cost components. In other words, the researcher can perfectly observe 
the amount of expenditures that are mismatched across the two time periods (that is, both 
    and        ). Suppose the researcher uses her perfect observation of individual 
cost components to estimate equation (4), but she only extracts the true expenditures 
pertaining to time t in her empirical estimation: 
                         (6a) 
                                (6b) 
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With perfect observation of cost components, estimating empirical equation (4) with the 
mismatched true expenditures is equivalent to estimating: 
                        
                                            (7) 
 In principle, it can be shown that in this case,  [  ]   [  ]    .5 Consider a 
simple firm where all types of costs are variable and exhibit similar profit margin (e.g., a 
cost-based pricing arrangement). In this scenario, when a firm imperfectly matches 
expenditures across different time periods that correspond to revenue at time t, the profit 
margin that is associated with each dollar of expense recognized in each time period 
should be similar, hence  [  ]   [  ]    . Consider a numerical example where a 
firm with only variable costs effects a mark-up of 50% for pricing purposes and which 
recognizes costs incurred for contemporaneous revenue at time t-1 and time t using the 
following proportion: 20% and 80% respectively. In this example, even though total 
expenses recognized in time t-1 and time t may differ,  [  ]   [  ]     = 1.5. 
 The above scenario assumes every dollar of cost (on average) has the same marginal 
productivity in generating revenue and the only issue lies in the mismatch between 
revenue and expenditures in different time periods.6 In this scenario,    provides no 
information about how conservative a firm is relative to other firms because    measures 
                                                          
5 From an empirical standpoint, the researcher will not be able to estimate equation (7) because both 
explanatory variables in the equation can be expressed as a linear combination of the other variable, which 
results in perfect collinearity. 
6 While not the focus of this model, it could be the case that different expenses recognized in different time 
periods have different marginal productivity in generating revenue. However, without a clear theory to 
explain why expenses recognized in time t-1 systematically have greater (or lesser) marginal productivity 
than expenses recognized in time t, I abstract away from this scenario in the above discussion. 
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only profit margin. To measure conservatism in this model of perfect observability, the 
researcher is better off using the relative weight of      and     to estimate the magnitude 
of conservatism across firms. The reason is that this relative weight indicates the extent to 
which expenses are advanced or mismatched in the preceding time period of the 
associated revenue, and thus this alternative measure is consistent with the notion of 
conservatism  .7 
 In sum, based on the scenario of imperfect matching with perfect observation of cost 
components, the    coefficient is inappropriate for measuring the extent of reporting 
conservatism, and a more feasible measure is considering the relative weight of     and 
  . In practice, it is unlikely that the empirical researcher can perfectly observe the 
mismatched expenditures that the firm observes. The case of imperfect matching and 
imperfect observability of cost components is examined next.  
 
2.4 Imperfect Matching with Imperfect Observation of Cost Components 
 Third, I consider a case where there is imperfect matching of revenue with 
contemporaneous costs incurred to earn that revenue as well as a researcher’s imperfect 
observation of cost components. In particular, the researcher observes: 
                               (8a)   
                                     (8b)      
 In this setting, in addition to imperfect matching by the firm, there is also imperfect 
observation of cost components by the empirical researcher. For instance, instead of 
                                                          
7 In particular,     
 
         
                 . 
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observing mismatched cost components         and     associated with revenue at 
time t individually, the researcher observes only expenses reported in time t (  ), which 
include costs incurred to earn revenue in time t and t+1 (that is,         and       
respectively, see expression 8b). Hence, there is a measurement error in the observed 
expenses      and   , and the issue is whether the    coefficient from estimating 
empirical equation (4) is an appropriate measure of reporting conservatism in the sample 
population.  
 To determine whether I can infer the true measure of conservatism   from estimating 
the   coefficient, I first derive an expression for the probability limit of the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimate of    . Because         is non-stationary for various 
values of        ,8 I provide a solution for the specific case where I can take the limit of 
        over time such that         
       
       
 and         becomes stationary. The 
OLS estimate of    is then expressed as follows (derived in detail in Appendix A):  
            
    [
                       
                                                  
] 
where            .  
 Dichev and Tang (2008) suggest that the estimated    coefficient is positively 
associated with reporting conservatism. The key to corroborating the authors’ claim is to 
demonstrate that the estimated    coefficient is increasing in reporting conservatism ( ). 
In the above expression, it is sufficient to show that the bracketed term is increasing in  . 
                                                          
8 That is,                            , where      is again a function of      and so on. 
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Note that the bracketed term varies with reporting conservatism ( ) and the time-series 
correlation in expenditures (  ). To determine whether    is increasing in  , I plot the 
solution to the bracketed term against values of   from 0 to 1 (in 0.01 increments), 
holding    constant at various levels between 0 and 0.99 (    0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 
0.99).9 Figure 1 plots the solution to    (vertical axis) against reporting conservatism   
(horizontal axis), conditional on various values of    and assuming   =1.2. 
  As shown in Figure 1, the probability limit of the OLS estimate of    is generally 
increasing in reporting conservatism ( ) at various assumed values of    between 0 and 
1. For smaller assumed values of    (that is,    = 0 and 0.25),    is increasing only 
monotonically in   until the point where   is approximately 0.75. However, this is not a 
crucial issue empirically because firms are unlikely to practice such high levels of 
reporting conservatism and the time-series correlation in expenditures (  ) is usually 
larger than 0.5. Hence, based on the scenario of imperfect matching and imperfect 
observability of cost components, the OLS estimate of    can be utilized to infer the 
firm’s true level of reporting conservatism ( ). 
 
2.5 Discussion 
 In sum, an examination of the econometric properties of Dichev and Tang’s (2008) 
matching model suggests that   can be a feasible measure of reporting conservatism in 
empirical studies based on certain model assumptions. Even though the researcher cannot 
                                                          
9 I do not examine the case where expenditures follow a random walk process (    1) because the limit of 
        
      
     
 is undefined when     1. 
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perfectly observe the mismatched expenditures pertaining to a particular revenue, the 
researcher can infer the firm’s level of reporting conservatism from estimating the    
coefficient. Based on the analyses in this section, the    coefficient from the Dichev-
Tang (2008) model measures only reporting conservatism because of the measurement 
error (or imperfect observability) in expenses, whereas based on the assumption of 
perfect observability (section 2.3), the    coefficient measures profit margin and thus 
provides no information about reporting conservatism. 
 Although I have established the relationship between the    coefficient and the 
unobserved level of reporting conservatism ( ), I have not evaluated the estimation 
efficiency of using the    coefficient as a measure of conservatism. In the following 
section, I conduct simulations to assess the specification and power of the test statistics 
using the conservatism measure based on the Dichev and Tang (2008) model. 
 
 
3. Simulations 
 
 In this section, I conduct simulations to test the power of the Dichev and Tang (2008) 
model to determine if the null hypothesis can be rejected when the alternative hypothesis 
is true. To do so, I create simulated data based on the model outlined in section 2.4 
detailing the case of imperfect matching and imperfect observability of cost components. 
For each simulated firm-year, I create 20 time-series observations to mimic the 
researcher’s estimation of    coefficient from a set of time-series data. I assume the 
following parameters for the model: 
1. Random shock in expenditures           
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2. Random shock in revenue           
3. Profit margin        
4. Correlation in expenditures    [     in increments of 0.25, up to a value of 0.99 
5. Reporting conservatism   [   ] in increments of 0.1, up to a value of 1 
 For each firm-year with 20 time-series observations, I run a regression of equation (4) 
to obtain the    coefficient. I then use a one-tailed test level of 5% to test whether the    
coefficient is greater than 0. For each combination of different values of     and   (5 x 11 
combinations), I simulate a dataset of 10,000 firm-years to compute the frequency of 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no reporting conservatism (  = 0). Note that for these 
simulations, I do not assume stationary variance of expenditures as I did when deriving 
the probability limit of the OLS estimate of    in section 2.4. The results of these 
simulations are plotted in Figure 2 and 3, where the estimated    coefficient and the 
frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis (vertical axis in Figure 2 and 3 respectively) is 
plotted against the magnitude of reporting conservatism (horizontal axis), conditional on 
various values of    .  
 As shown in Figure 2, based on simulated data, the plot of the estimated    
coefficient is similar to the plot of the solution to             in Figure 1. Figure 3 
indicates that the frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis when there is no reporting 
conservatism (  = 0) is approximately 5%, which is not significantly different from 5% 
based on a two-tailed binomial test (results untabulated). This suggests that the frequency 
of Type 1 error (rejecting the null hypothesis when the null is true) is the same as the 
specified test level. 
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 When there is reporting conservatism (  > 0), the frequency of rejecting the null 
hypothesis gradually increases to only about 20% when   is approximately between 0.35 
and 0.4. In fact, the frequency of rejection is relatively low when   < 0.5. This suggests 
that the frequency of Type 2 error (not rejecting the null hypothesis when the null is 
false) is relatively high when we use the estimated    coefficient to measure reporting 
conservatism.  
 In sum, the results from the simulations suggest that using the estimated    
coefficient to measure reporting conservatism produces well-specified test statistics that 
generate Type 1 errors according to researchers’ specifications. However, using this 
measure to test the magnitude and incidence of conservatism generates tests of low power 
that require a relatively large magnitude of reporting conservatism in order to accurately 
reject the null hypothesis of no conservatism.  Obviously, the above tests of the model’s 
power are based on explicit assumptions of the expenditures and revenue generating 
processes and the process by which expenditures are matched to revenue. To the extent 
that the assumptions are not representative of actual revenue, expenditures and matching 
processes, the above tests may lack external validity and hence, the results of the 
simulations should be interpreted with consideration of the model’s assumptions. 
 In the following section, I describe and present the results of construct validity tests 
of this measure of conservatism using actual data. 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
4. Construct Validity Tests 
 
4.1 Empirical Predictions of the Model 
 Based on the expression for the probability limit of the OLS estimate of    in section 
2.4, I can derive several empirical predictions from the model that I can test to see if the 
estimated    coefficient correlates with other variables using actual data based on these 
expectations. In the model, the probability limit of the OLS estimate of    is expressed as 
follows: 
            
    [
                       
                                                  
] 
where            .  
 As observed from the above expression,             varies with  ,    and   . In 
what follows, I describe empirical proxies for these variables that I use to test the 
predictions of the model. 
4.1.1 Reporting conservatism ( ). From section 2.4, I demonstrated that the estimated 
   coefficient can be utilized to measure reporting conservatism, which I define to be an 
unobserved value of   in the model. Empirically,    should vary with accounting 
practices that are expected a priori to be associated with conservative reporting. The first 
empirical proxy for reporting conservatism is research and development (R&D) and 
advertising expense intensity (ADV).10 R&D and advertising expenses are incurred to 
drive sales revenue, but because of the difficulty in matching these expenses to their 
                                                          
10 Detailed descriptions of all variables used in this paper are included in Appendix C. 
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associated revenue and the complexity involved in verifying their future economic 
benefits, these expenses are not capitalized and are expensed as incurred.11 Therefore, I 
expect R&D and advertising expense intensity to be positively associated with the 
estimated    coefficient. 
 The second empirical proxy for reporting conservatism is the rate of depreciation for 
fixed assets (DPRATE). Firms are required to depreciate the value of their fixed assets 
over the assets’ estimated useful life. However, firms have reasonable discretion in 
determining the estimated useful life when depreciating the value of the assets. Firms that 
depreciate the value of their assets over a shorter useful life are regarded as reporting 
more conservatively, and hence, I expect the rate of depreciation for fixed assets to be 
positively associated with the estimated    coefficient. 
 The third empirical proxy for reporting conservatism is the market-to-book ratio 
(MB). In prior research (e.g., Beaver & Ryan, 2000; Feltham & Ohlson, 1995), it is  
suggested that accounting conservatism is manifested in higher market-to-book ratio 
because equity values reflect expectations of future cash flows -- expectations that are not 
reflected in book values that are understated as a result of reporting conservatism. Hence, 
I expect the market-to-book ratio to be positively associated with the estimated    
coefficient. 
 The final empirical proxy for reporting conservatism is the extent of fixed costs 
versus variable costs in the firm’s cost structure (FIXED). This proxy is related to R&D, 
advertising and depreciation (manufacturing unrelated) expenses because these expenses 
                                                          
11 See Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 2 for precise accounting rules relating to 
research and development expenses. 
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are difficult to trace and are usually considered fixed or period costs. Even though this 
proxy is not directly associated with reporting conservatism, I include this proxy because 
based on the model,   is positively associated with matching difficulty, and the latter is 
affected by the cost structure of the firm. Therefore, I expect the extent of fixed costs in 
the cost structure to be positively associated with the estimated    coefficient. 
4.1.2 Time-series correlation in expenditures (  ). Based on the model, the OLS 
estimate of    varies with the time-series correlation in expenditures   . The empirical 
proxy for   will be the estimated coefficient from a regression of expenses on past 
expenses (EXPCORR). From the solution plotted in Figure 1, the relationship between 
the estimated    and    is indeterminate because when   is approximately less than 0.4, 
   is increasing in    but when   is greater than 0.4,    is decreasing in   . Therefore, I 
expect the time-series correlation in expenses to be associated (positively or negatively) 
with the estimated    coefficient. 
4.1.3 Profit margin (  ). From the solution to            , I determine    to be 
increasing in profit margin   . Because I cannot determine the true expenditures incurred 
to earn the corresponding revenue, I also cannot determine the firm’s economic profit 
margin. Therefore, I use the firm’s reported profit margin as an empirical proxy for   , 
which is defined as income before extraordinary items divided by sales (MARGIN). I 
expect the profit margin to be positively associated with the estimated    coefficient. 
4.1.4 Random noise in expenditures (  ) and revenue (  ). Finally, I analyze the 
empirical relationship between the estimated    coefficient and the random noise in 
expenditures (  ) and revenue (  ). As indicated by the solution to the OLS estimate of 
  , random noise in expenditures and revenue should not affect the magnitude of the    
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coefficient when I assume stationarity of expenditures at the limit. Empirically, noise in 
expenses and revenue may lead to greater difficulty in matching. Hence, reporting 
conservatism, which in essence is a manifestation of lack of matching, is expected to 
increase in noise. Therefore, I expect noise in expenditures and revenue to be positively 
associated with the estimated    coefficient. I estimate the noise in expenditures (  ) and 
revenue (   ) using the volatility in recognized expenses (EXPVOL) and revenue 
(SALEVOL) respectively. 
 
4.2 Empirical Results 
 I obtain my initial sample of firm-year observations from 1971 – 2007 from 
COMPUSTAT. I include firms that are incorporated in the US, listed in the US stock 
exchanges (EXCHG code between 11 and 19), and with stock returns data from CRSP. I 
also exclude financials (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) because these 
regulated firms are likely distinctive in their financial reporting activities. My main 
sample, after data requirements are met, consists of 58,650 firm-years. To mitigate the 
influence of outliers, I discard observations where the value of the continuous variables is 
lower (higher) than the 1% (99%) levels. 
 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main sample. The firms in my 
sample are generally larger than the COMPUSTAT universe in the corresponding sample 
period. The sample median of total assets is $180 million whereas the COMPUSTAT 
median of total assets is $86 million (untabulated). This size difference is due to my firm-
year specific measurement of reporting conservatism (  ) that requires data from the 
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previous 10 fiscal years. Therefore, my sample is composed of only larger firms that have 
survived at least 10 years. 
 Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation between the estimated    coefficient and 
other variables. Consistent with the model’s predictions,    is positively correlated with 
various empirical proxies of reporting conservatism  , which include research and 
development expense intensity (R&D, Pearson correlation = 0.16); rate of depreciation 
for fixed assets (DPRATE, Pearson correlation = 0.09); the market-to-book ratio (MB, 
Pearson correlation = 0.10); and the extent of fixed versus variable costs in the firms’ cost 
structure (FIXED, Pearson correlation = 0.17). However, I do not find evidence of a 
significant positive relationship between    and advertising expense intensity (ADV, 
Pearson correlation = 0.01). 
 Next, I find that the empirical proxy for time-series correlation in expenditures    
(EXPCORR) is negatively correlated with   (Pearson correlation = -0.03), which is 
consistent with the model’s prediction that    is related to   . However, I find that profit 
margin    is negatively correlated with   (MARGIN, Pearson correlation = -0.12), 
which is contrary to the model’s predictions. A possible explanation for this surprising 
result is that profit margin is a proxy for a firm’s performance, and a firm with poor 
performance is also more likely to recognize expense ahead of the associated revenue 
(“big bath”). 
 Finally, expense volatility (EXPVOL) is positively correlated with   (Pearson 
correlation = 0.03), which is consistent with the earlier prediction that noise can lead to 
poor matching and hence results in a higher estimated   coefficient.  
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 The earlier discussion is based on pairwise univariate correlations, and to confirm my 
results based on multivariate analysis, I also run a regression of    on all other variables. 
Table 3 presents the results of this regression. As shown in this table, most of the 
regression coefficients are consistent with the univariate analysis except for advertising 
expense intensity (ADV), which is now found to be negative and significant (coefficient 
= -0.183, t-statistic = -2.41), whereas it is positive and insignificant (Pearson correlation 
= 0.01) in the correlation table. Also, due to the high correlation between sales volatility 
(SALEVOL) and expense volatility (EXPVOL, Pearson correlation = 0.94), there is a 
potential issue with multi-collinearity (Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) > 10, 
untabulated). When I include only either SALEVOL or EXPVOL in the regression, both 
coefficients are positive but only the coefficient of EXPVOL is significant, a finding that 
is consistent with the univariate analysis. Overall, the results of the regression are largely 
consistent with the univariate analysis. 
 From section 2.4, I conclude that the              is strictly increasing over certain 
values of reporting conservatism ( ). It is interesting to examine the sample properties of 
the empirical estimate of   to see if the sample   falls in the range of values where    is 
strictly increasing as predicted by the model. To do so, I estimate the sample   by 
computing the sum of research and development expenses, advertising expenses and 
depreciation expenses, divided by total expenses in the fiscal year. The sample mean 
(median) of   is 0.08 (0.06) and the first (third) quartile value of   is 0.03 (0.10). 
Although this estimation suggests that the sample   falls in the range where    is strictly 
increasing, it also indicates that the    coefficient is likely to generate tests of low power 
at such low values of  . 
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 In sum, the empirical results in this section generally support the predictions of the 
model. Therefore, the empirical findings provide some support for the use of    as an 
empirical proxy for the unobserved level of reporting conservatism ( ) as recommended 
by Dichev and Tang (2008). Moreover, the empirical findings indicate that other 
variables unrelated to reporting conservatism (e.g., proxies of   ,    and   ) may be 
correlated with the estimated   . Hence, it is important to control for these variables in 
the empirical model for hypothesis testing. Finally, the empirical estimation of   
confirms earlier results from simulations that the    coefficient is likely to generate tests 
of low power to detect conservatism in the sample population. 
 
5. Alternative Measure of Conservatism using a Reverse Regression Specification 
 
 The findings in the earlier sections suggest that the    coefficient from the Dichev 
and Tang (2008) model is a feasible measure of conservatism. However, results from 
simulations also indicate that this measure generates tests of relatively low power. In this 
section, I explore an alternative measure of conservatism using a reverse regression 
specification to determine if this measure is statistically superior to the    coefficient. 
 In the Dichev and Tang (2008) model, I measure reporting conservatism based on the 
estimated   coefficient from the following empirical equation: 
                                   (4) 
Based on the matching model (section 3.2), expenditures are matched to the associated 
revenue. Therefore, the matching process can also be expressed empirically as a reverse 
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regression where I estimate reporting conservatism based on the estimated    coefficient 
from the following empirical equation: 
                                   (9) 
In the above expression, the estimated    coefficient measures the relationship between 
current recognized expenses and future revenue, a relationship that is consistent with the 
notion of conservatism represented by the   coefficient. The above expression seems 
natural because it reflects how the revenue earned in time t and time t+1 determine the 
amount of expense recognized in time t. In a way, this specification (equation 9) focuses 
on the matching process, which emphasizes revenue driving recognized expenses, 
whereas the original specification (equation 4) focuses on the revenue generating process, 
which emphasizes expenditures driving revenue. Both specifications can be interpreted as 
opposite sides of the same coin, and the empirical specification chosen depends on the 
needs and interests of the researcher. For purposes of this paper, I am interested in 
deriving an empirical measure of reporting conservatism (   or    coefficient) and hence 
both specifications are appropriate. The key question is which measure (   or    
coefficient) exhibits superior statistical properties. In the following sub-sections, I will 
first evaluate whether the estimated    coefficient measures the unobserved level of 
reporting conservatism ( ). I will then conduct simulations to assess the specification and 
power of the test statistics of the    coefficient and compare them with the test statistics 
generated by the    coefficient. 
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5.1   Probability Limit of the OLS Estimate of     
 To derive the probability limit of the OLS estimate of   , I use the model 
assumptions provided in section 2.4 in the case of imperfect matching and imperfect 
observability of cost components. As in section 2.4, I provide a solution for the specific 
case where I take the limit of         over time such that         
       
       
 and 
        becomes stationary. Based on these assumptions, the probability limit of the 
OLS estimate of    is given by (derived in detail in Appendix B): 
              
  [         ]                 
  
                          
[      ] 
      
 
 To determine whether    is increasing in  , I plot the solution to              against 
values of   from 0 to 1 (in 0.01 increments), holding    constant at various levels 
between 0 and 0.99 (    0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.99). Additionally, because the solution 
is also dependent on   ,        and       , I arbitrarily set    equals to 1.2 and both  
       and        equal to 1. Figure 4 plots the solution to             (vertical axis) 
against reporting conservatism   (horizontal axis), conditional on various values of    
and assuming    = 1.2 and        =        = 1. 
 As shown in Figure 4, the probability limit of the OLS estimate of    is strictly 
increasing in reporting conservatism ( ) at various assumed values of    between 0 and 
1. This result compares favorably to the solution to             (Figure 1) where 
            is increasing only monotonically in   until the point where   is 
approximately larger than 0.75. However, note that for values where    > 0,             
does not start from the origin when   = 0. Intuitively, when   = 0,  
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Therefore, the    coefficient, which measures the relationship between    and      in 
equation (9), also captures the relationship between    and     , and this relationship is 
increasing in the time-series correlation in expenditures   . 
 This result may present a problem in statistical tests because the    coefficient is 
positive even in the absence of conservatism (  = 0). To determine whether this issue is 
problematic for test statistics, I conduct simulations to assess the specification and power 
of the test statistics of the    coefficient. Findings are presented in the following sub-
section.  
 
5.2   Test Statistics of the    Coefficient  
 To assess the specification and power of the test statistics of the    coefficient, I 
conduct simulations using the same parameters outlined in section 3.3.  The results of 
these simulations are plotted in Figure 5 and 6, where the estimated    coefficient and the 
frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis (vertical axis in Figure 5 and 6 respectively) is 
plotted against the magnitude of reporting conservatism (horizontal axis), conditional on 
various values of    .  
 Figure 5 indicates that the estimated    coefficient is strictly increasing in reporting 
conservatism ( ), which is consistent with the plot of the solution to             in 
Figure 4. As shown in Figure 6, when there is no reporting conservatism (  = 0) and no 
time-series correlation in expenditures (   = 0), the frequency of rejecting the null 
hypothesis is approximately 5%, which is consistent with the specified test level. 
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However, when    > 0, the frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis monotonically 
increases as    increases, even in the absence of conservatism (  = 0). In fact, when    = 
0.99, the frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis when   = 0 is very high at 
approximately 61%. This suggests that the frequency of a Type 1 error (rejecting the null 
hypothesis when the null is true) is greater than the specified test level when    > 0. 
 When there is reporting conservatism (  > 0), the frequency of rejecting the null 
hypothesis increases to more than 90% when   > 0.5. Figure 7 provides a comparison of 
test power between    and    at various values of   , and the figure suggests that the    
coefficient generates tests of greater power than does the   coefficient. In terms of test 
power, the    coefficient is clearly more powerful than the   coefficient. However, the 
   coefficient appears to over-reject the null hypothesis when    > 0. 
 As highlighted in the preceding sub-section, the issue of an upward biased coefficient 
of     is due to the time-series correlation in expenditures   . A possible means of 
controlling for    in the estimation of the    coefficient is to include future recognized 
expenses in the regression. That is, instead of estimating equation (9), I estimate the 
following equation: 
                                       (10) 
The purpose of including      in equation (10) is to control for the time-series correlation 
in expenditures    in the estimation of the    coefficient. To assess if this methodology 
mitigates the upward bias in the    coefficient, I conduct simulations to assess the test 
statistics of the    coefficient estimated from equation (10). The results of these 
simulations are plotted in Figure 8 and 9.  
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 As observed from Figure 8, the estimated    coefficient is still strictly increasing in 
reporting conservatism ( ) at various values of    after I control for       in equation 
(10). However, note that the estimated    coefficient is slightly above 0 in the absence of 
conservatism (  = 0) at all values of   . Further investigation reveals that the upward 
biased coefficient is due to multicollinearity from having both      and      as 
explanatory variables in equation (10), and a short time-series of 20 observations in the 
simulations appears to exacerbate the bias.12 
 With respect to test statistics, the frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis when 
there is no conservatism (  = 0) ranges from 6% to 8%, and these frequencies are 
significantly different from the specified test level of 5% based on a two-tailed binomial 
test (results untabulated). This suggests that the test statistics are misspecified after 
controlling for     , albeit with a much smaller bias than is presented in the original    
coefficient specification. 
 Figure 9 indicates that the test power declines after I control for      in equation (10). 
When there is reporting conservatism (   > 0), the frequency of rejecting the null 
hypothesis gradually increases to only about 20% when   is approximately 0.3. If we 
compare the test power of    and    after controlling for     , as shown in Figure 10, the 
   coefficient is slightly superior to the    coefficient in terms of test power. The results 
suggest that by controlling for      in equation (10), I am able to obtain a    coefficient 
that has fewer Type 1 errors and more Type 2 errors than the original    coefficient 
specification. 
                                                          
12 In separate simulations, I confirm that the bias becomes smaller as I increase the number of time-series 
observations in the regression (results untabulated). 
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5.3 Discussion 
 In summary, in this section, I evaluate an alternative measure of reporting 
conservatism using a reverse regression specification of the Dichev and Tang (2008) 
model. Analytical derivation indicates that the solution to              strictly increases 
in reporting conservatism ( ), which compares favorably to the solution to            , 
which only strictly increases over certain values of  . Results from the simulations 
demonstrate that although the    coefficient generates tests of relatively high power, it 
also appears to over-reject the null hypothesis when conservatism is absent. After I 
control for      in the estimation of the    coefficient, the resulting coefficient is slightly 
superior to the    coefficient in terms of test power. Overall, the results in this section 
suggest that the    coefficient is a feasible alternative to the    coefficient when 
maximizing test power is an important consideration for the empirical researcher. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, this paper provides a critical evaluation of the econometric properties 
of the measure of reporting conservatism introduced recently by Dichev and Tang (2008). 
I find that in the case of imperfect matching and imperfect observability of cost 
components, the measurement error in the recognized expenses allows the researcher to 
infer the true level of conservatism from the estimated    coefficient in the Dichev and 
Tang (2008) model. Although the estimated    coefficient produces well-specified test 
statistics that generate Type 1 errors according to researchers’ specifications, I find that 
this measure generates tests of low power that lead to relatively high Type 2 errors. Next, 
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I find empirical results that are consistent with the model’s predictions. Although the 
empirical findings generally provide support for using the estimated    coefficient as a 
measure of conservatism, the researcher is also advised to include other correlated 
variables in the empirical model to mitigate the omitted correlated variables problem, 
which may lead to spurious inferences in hypothesis testing. Finally, I explore an 
alternative measure of conservatism using a reverse regression specification. Results 
from simulations suggest that this alternative measure is feasible and is slightly superior 
to the    coefficient in terms of test power. 
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APPENDIX A 
Derivation of             under Imperfect Matching with Imperfect Observation of 
Cost Components 
 
Define a firm with the following generating process for expenditures: 
                 
Expenditures are incurred to generate revenue based on the following process: 
               
Firms vary in different levels of reporting conservatism. Conservatism is defined as the 
extent to which expenditures are recognized before the associated revenue. From a 
modeling view, expenses recognized in time t (  ) is defined as follows: 
                  
Hence, based on the above relation between true expenditures (E) and recognized 
expenses (e),   measures the proportion of true expenditures in time t+1 (    ) that is 
recognized in advance in time t (   ). This notion is consistent with reporting 
conservatism, and I define conservatism in this model to be increasing in  . The 
empirical researcher can only observe recognized expenses (e) but not true expenditures 
(E). The issue is whether we can infer a firm’s level of reporting conservatism   by 
examining the relation between revenue and past and present recognized expenses as 
suggested by Dichev and Tang (2008): 
                      
Without loss of generality, assume      . Under this assumption, 
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Because    is modeled as a mean-zero white noise, the following statistical properties 
apply: 
                      
                          
Let            , therefore, the probability limit of the OLS estimate of    is given 
by: 
            
 
                                          
                 [            ] 
 
 
                                       
                             [                        ] 
 
 
                                                 
                             [                        ] 
 
 
[                         ][                  ]
[                    ][                  ]  [                       ] 
 
 
          [                       ]
[                    ][                  ]  [                       ] 
 
 
                            [      ] 
[                    ][                  ]  [                       ] 
 
 
To simplify the above expression, I first derive a representation for        : 
                             
Note that the variance of      is again a function of      and so on. Using recursive 
substitution,         can be expressed as: 
 34 
 
               [           ] 
The limit of         can be simplified as: 
                    
      
       
 
I then derive a representation of              as follows: 
                                     
                                                                               
                                  
        
       
 
Hence, the probability limit of the OLS estimate of    becomes: 
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APPENDIX B 
Derivation of     (     ) using a Reverse Regression Specification 
  
 In the Dichev and Tang (2008) model, I measure reporting conservatism based on the 
estimated   coefficient from the following empirical equation: 
                      
I can also use a reverse regression and estimate reporting conservatism based on the 
estimated    coefficient from the following empirical equation: 
                      
 As before, I first evaluate if I can infer the unobserved level of reporting conservatism 
( ) based on the estimated    coefficient. I use the same model assumptions based on 
section 2.4 in the case of imperfect matching and imperfect observability of cost 
components. Because    is also modeled as a mean-zero white noise, the following 
statistical properties apply: 
                      
                          
Therefore, the probability limit of the OLS estimate of    is given by: 
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As before, I derive a representation for         to simplify the above expression: 
                             
Note that the variance of      is again a function of      and so on. Using recursive 
substitution,         can be expressed as: 
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The limit of         can be simplified as: 
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APPENDIX C 
Variables Definition13 
 
   Defined as    in the following firm-year specific time series regression in 
the prior ten-year rolling window: 
 REVENUEt =    +   *EXPt-1 +   *EXPt +   *EXPt+1 +    
 where REVENUE is sales (SALE) and EXP is expenses (SALE – IB). 
ADV Advertising expenditure (XAD) scaled by sales (SALE) in the fiscal year. 
This variable is set to zero if missing. 
ASSETS Total assets (AT) at the end of the fiscal year. 
DPRATE Rate of depreciation for fixed assets, defined as depreciation expense for 
the fiscal year (DP) divided by the gross property, plant and equipment 
(PPEGT) at the end of the fiscal year. 
EXPCORR The time-series correlation in expenditures, defined as the estimated 
coefficient from a firm-year specific time-series regression of expenses on 
past expenses (SALE – IB) in the prior ten-year rolling window.  
EXPVOL Volatility of expenses (SALE - IB), measured over at least 3 years in the 
prior ten fiscal years. 
FIXED The extent of fixed costs in the firm’s cost structure, defined as total 
expenses (SALE – IB) less cost of goods sold (COGS), divided by total 
expenses in the fiscal year. 
MARGIN Profit margin, defined income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by 
sales (SALE) in the fiscal year. 
                                                          
13 COMPUSTAT variables in parentheses, unless otherwise noted. 
 39 
 
MB The market-to-book ratio at the end of the fiscal year, defined as the sum 
of the book value of debt (AT – CEQ) and market value of equity 
(CSHO*PRCC_F) divided by total assets (AT).  
R&D Research and development expenditure (XRD) scaled by sales (SALE) in 
the fiscal year. This variable is set to zero if missing. 
SALEVOL Volatility of sales (SALE), measured over at least 3 years in the prior ten 
fiscal years. 
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Table 1 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
       Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
α1 58,650 0.059 0.026 0.164 -0.028 0.118 
R&D 59,217 0.024 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.023 
ADV 59,245 0.009 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.011 
DPRATE 58,202 0.084 0.072 0.045 0.057 0.097 
MB 58,431 1.502 1.223 0.879 0.969 1.700 
FIXED 58,598 0.311 0.280 0.163 0.195 0.400 
EXPCORR 58,650 0.534 0.568 0.310 0.333 0.759 
MARGIN 58,598 0.017 0.036 0.149 0.010 0.065 
SALEVOL 58,636 0.230 0.182 0.166 0.116 0.289 
EXPVOL 58,636 0.233 0.179 0.182 0.110 0.292 
ASSETS 58,650 1,185.9 179.6 3,127.1 49.1 780.9 
              
The sample consists of 58,650 US-incorporated firm-years from 1971 – 2007 and excluding financials (SIC 
6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). α1 is the estimated coefficient of past expenses in the firm-year 
specific time-series regression of revenue on past, present and future expenses, estimated over the prior ten 
fiscal years. R&D is research and development expenditure scaled by sales for the fiscal year. ADV is 
advertising expenditure scaled by sales for the fiscal year. DPRATE is the rate of depreciation for fixed 
assets for the fiscal year. MB is the market-to-book ratio at the end of the fiscal year. FIXED is the extent 
of fixed costs versus variable costs in the firm’s cost structure for the fiscal year. EXPCORR is the time-
series correlation in expenses estimated over the prior ten fiscal years. MARGIN is the firm’s profit margin 
for the fiscal year. SALEVOL is the volatility of sales measured over at least 3 years in the prior ten fiscal 
years. EXPVOL is the volatility of expenses measured over at least 3 years in the prior ten fiscal years. 
ASSETS is the total assets of the firm at the end of the fiscal year. 
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Table 2 
Pearson Correlation Table 
The sample consists of 58,650 US-incorporated firm-years from 1971 – 2007 and excluding financials (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-
4999). α1 is the estimated coefficient of past expenses in the firm-year specific time-series regression of revenue on past, present and future 
expenses, estimated over the prior ten fiscal years. R&D is research and development expenditure scaled by sales for the fiscal year. ADV is 
advertising expenditure scaled by sales for the fiscal year. DPRATE is the rate of depreciation for fixed assets for the fiscal year. MB is the market-
to-book ratio at the end of the fiscal year. FIXED is the extent of fixed costs versus variable costs in the firm’s cost structure for the fiscal year. 
EXPCORR is the time-series correlation in expenses estimated over the prior ten fiscal years. MARGIN is the firm’s profit margin for the fiscal 
year. SALEVOL is the volatility of sales measured over at least 3 years in the prior ten fiscal years. EXPVOL is the volatility of expenses measured 
over at least 3 years in the prior ten fiscal years. All correlations except those in bold are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better. 
 
 
 
α1 R&D ADV DPRATE MB FIXED EXPCORR MARGIN SALEVOL EXPVOL
α1 1.00
R&D 0.16 1.00
ADV 0.01 -0.01 1.00
DPRATE 0.09 0.24 0.01 1.00
MB 0.10 0.29 0.07 0.19 1.00
FIXED 0.17 0.41 0.22 0.24 0.33 1.00
EXPCORR -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 1.00
MARGIN -0.12 -0.27 0.03 -0.15 0.02 -0.14 0.07 1.00
SALEVOL 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.21 0.01 -0.15 0.20 -0.13 1.00
EXPVOL 0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.23 0.04 -0.10 0.15 -0.19 0.94 1.00
 42 
 
Table 3 
Empirical Test of the Model's Predictions 
 
 
α1 
  
 
Pred. Coef. t-stats 
   R&D + 0.212 4.47 *** 
  ADV + -0.183 -2.41 ** 
  DPRATE + 0.071 1.80 * 
  MB + 0.008 3.27 *** 
  FIXED + 0.130 9.85 *** 
  EXPCORR +/- -0.008 -1.94 * 
  MARGIN + -0.132 -6.08 *** 
  SALEVOL + -0.138 -3.04 *** 
  EXPVOL + 0.150 3.39 *** 
  CONSTANT 
 
0.002 0.19 
   
       Adjusted R2 
 
0.053 
    Observations 
 
52,053 
             
The sample for the regression consists of 52,053 US-incorporated firm-years from 1971 – 2007 and 
excluding financials (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). α1 is the estimated coefficient of past 
expenses in the firm-year specific time-series regression of revenue on past, present and future expenses, 
estimated over the prior ten fiscal years. R&D is research and development expenditure scaled by sales for 
the fiscal year. ADV is advertising expenditure scaled by sales for the fiscal year. DPRATE is the rate of 
depreciation for fixed assets for the fiscal year. MB is the market-to-book ratio at the end of the fiscal year. 
FIXED is the extent of fixed costs versus variable costs in the firm’s cost structure for the fiscal year. 
EXPCORR is the time-series correlation in expenses estimated over the prior ten fiscal years. MARGIN is 
the firm’s profit margin for the fiscal year. SALEVOL is the volatility of sales measured over at least 3 
years in the prior ten fiscal years. EXPVOL is the volatility of expenses measured over at least 3 years in 
the prior ten fiscal years. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence 
(Gow, Ormazabal & Taylor, 2010; Petersen, 2009). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Figure 1.     (     ) Conditional on   and    
The above graph plots the solution to             against reporting conservatism ( ), assuming   =1.2 and    taking on various values between 0 and 1. 
The probability limit of the OLS estimate of    is expressed as follows: 
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Figure 2. Estimated    Coefficient Conditional on   and    
The above graph plots the magnitude of the estimated    coefficient against the assumed levels of conservatism ( ) ranging from 0 to 1. Each simulation 
uses 10,000 firm-years, and each firm-year consists of 20 time-series observations of revenue and expenses 
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Figure 3. Estimated Rejection Rates for   Conditional on   and    
The above graph plots the frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis of no reporting conservatism against the assumed levels of conservatism ( ) ranging 
from 0 to 1 and uses a one-sided test level of 5% for rejecting the null hypothesis. Each simulation uses 10,000 firm-years, and each firm-year consists of 20 
time-series observations of revenue and expenses 
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Figure 4.     (     ) Conditional on   and    
The above graph plots the solution to             against reporting conservatism ( ), assuming   =1.2,        = 1,        = 1 and    taking on various 
values between 0 and 1. The probability limit of the OLS estimate of    is expressed as follows: 
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Figure 5. Estimated    Coefficient Conditional on   and    
The above graph plots the magnitude of the estimated    coefficient against the assumed levels of conservatism ( ) ranging from 0 to 1. Each simulation 
uses 10,000 firm-years, and each firm-year consists of 20 time-series observations of revenue and expenses. 
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Figure 6. Estimated Rejection Rates for    Conditional on   and    
The above graph plots the frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis of no reporting conservatism against the assumed levels of conservatism ( ) ranging 
from 0 to 1 and uses a one-sided test level of 5% for rejecting the null hypothesis. Each simulation uses 10,000 firm-years, and each firm-year consists of 20 
time-series observations of revenue and expenses 
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Figure 7. Comparison of Estimated Rejection Rates for    and    
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Figure 7. Comparison of Estimated Rejection Rates for    and    (continued) 
The above graphs plots the frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis of no reporting conservatism against the assumed levels of conservatism ( ) ranging 
from 0 to 1 and uses a one-sided test level of 5% for rejecting the null hypothesis. Each simulation uses 10,000 firm-years, and each firm-year consists of 20 
time-series observations of revenue and expenses 
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Figure 8. Estimated    Coefficient (controlling for     ) Conditional on   and    
The above graph plots the magnitude of the estimated    coefficient against the assumed levels of conservatism ( ) ranging from 0 to 1. Each simulation 
uses 10,000 firm-years, and each firm-year consists of 20 time-series observations of revenue and expenses 
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Figure 9. Estimated Rejection Rates for    (controlling for     ) Conditional on   and    
The above graph plots the frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis of no reporting conservatism against the assumed levels of conservatism ( ) ranging 
from 0 to 1 and uses a one-sided test level of 5% for rejecting the null hypothesis. Each simulation uses 10,000 firm-years, and each firm-year consists of 20 
time-series observations of revenue and expenses 
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Figure 10. Comparison of Estimated Rejection Rates for    and    (controlling for     ) 
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Figure 10. Comparison of Estimated Rejection Rates for    and    (controlling for     ) (continued) 
The above graphs plots the frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis of no reporting conservatism against the assumed levels of conservatism ( ) ranging 
from 0 to 1 and uses a one-sided test level of 5% for rejecting the null hypothesis. Each simulation uses 10,000 firm-years, and each firm- year consists of 20 
time-series observations of revenue and expenses 
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